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Case No. 20170977-CA 
 
 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
 
Pursuant to rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant 
Robert Brian Walton, through counsel, answers the facts and arguments raised in 
the Brief of Appellee as follows: 
FACTS 
 The State’s recitation of facts consists almost entirely of unproven 
allegations of the complaining witness, which do not support the plea agreements 
and have not been proven in court.  Only those facts that support the plea 
agreements are pertinent to this appeal because Mr. Walton’s sentence must be 
supported by facts as stated in the guilty pleas. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 
542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (“exceptional” sentence was not justified “solely on the 
basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea”).   As stated in his opening brief, Mr. 
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Walton denied all allegations, entering his pleas under Alford.1 1R987, 1R994-95; 
2R549, 2R555-56. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Walton challenges only his sentence, not the plea 
agreement. 
The State argues that the permanent criminal stalking injunction is not 
part of the sentence. Br.Aple. at 13-15.  In support, the State argues that the 
sentence consisted of only 330 days in jail and that the stalking injunction not 
only not a sentence, but the sole consideration.  Id. at 14.   
A. The permanent criminal stalking injunction is part of the 
sentence. 
The State cites no authority to suggest that a permanent criminal stalking 
injunction—which imposes a lifelong restriction on a person’s liberty—is not a 
sentence.  As stated in Mr. Walton’s opening brief, this Court has previously 
determined that a permanent criminal stalking injunction is a sentence. See See 
Br.Aplt. at 11; State v. Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 23, 360 P.3d 1 (quoting Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e)) (“[W]e conclude that the district court’s failure to enter the 
injunction amounted to an omission of ‘a term required to be imposed by statute’ 
as a consequence of Kropf’s stalking conviction.”).  The State’s failure to respond 
                                               
1 In addition, Mr. Walton wants the court to know that apart from the charged 
conduct, he has not been charged with any incident involving K.B.  Additionally, 
the allegations of Case No. 161907013 were the result of an invite by K.B. which 
Mr. Walton only responded to after he checked with police and learned there was 
no injunction in place.  2R45; 2R556-57.  And, the injunction was not actually 
entered by the Court until July 5, 2016—days after the charged conduct.  2R45.  
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to this argument or to cite any authority to support its position that a permanent 
criminal stalking injunction is not a sentence is reason enough to vacate the 
illegal sentence.  See State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 20, 345 P.3d 1226 (“[A]n 
appellee who fails to respond to the merits of an appellant’s argument will risk 
default.”). 2 
B. The permanent criminal stalking injunction was only 
partial consideration. 
This is not to say that the sentence, including the permanent criminal 
stalking injunction, was not part of the consideration.  A sentence is generally 
part of the consideration in plea agreements.  See, e.g., Manning v. State, 2004 
UT App 87, ¶ 32, 89 P.3d 196 (“[W]hether the defendant received the sentence 
bargained for as part of the plea” is part of analysis of plea agreement) (citation 
omitted).  
That an illegal sentence is included in a plea agreement does not take the 
analysis outside of Rule 11(e).  Mr. Walton is not challenging his conviction as the 
State asserts. See Br.Aple. at 15.  He is not arguing a complete lack of 
                                               
2 The State also argues that the permanent criminal stalking injunction is not part 
of the sentence because the trial court did not see it as such.  Br.Aple. at 14.  
However, under Rule 22(e) challenge to an illegal sentence, conclusions of law 
are reviewed for correctness awarding no deference to the trial court. See, e.g., 
State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 16, 353 P.3d 55; State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 13, 
274 P.3d 919. The State cites no authority to support the trial court’s reasoning as 
to the nature of the permanent criminal stalking injunction, so this Court should 






consideration or that the entire plea agreement is unconscionable as the State 
suggests. See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996) (citing Bekins 
Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459-62 (Utah 1983))  (“[U]nder Utah 
law, an unconscionable agreement is not enforceable.”); Gen. Ins. Co. v. 
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976)(“Where consideration 
is lacking, there can be no contract.”). Rather, as stated in his opening brief, Mr. 
Walton’s argument is that the stalking injunction amounts to an illegal sentence, 
and should therefore be severed from the plea agreement.  See Br.Aplt. at 14-16.  
The State fails to answer Mr. Walton’s argument that even without the 
permanent criminal stalking injunction, there was adequate consideration—his 
third degree felony conviction and the more than 24 months he served in jail. See 
Br.Aplt. at 15; Br.Aple. at 14-15.  The State also cites no authority to support its 
assertion that consideration for a plea agreement can consist entirely of "terms 
that fall outside” of the realm of a conviction or sentence, and counsel could find 
none. See Br.Aple. at 15.   
This Court should “refuse to relieve the State of what it now considers a 
bad bargain where the plea agreement was the result of uninduced mistake as to 
the current provisions of Utah statute.”  See, e.g., State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 
388 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (defendant entitled to resentencing under plea 
agreement that included illegal sentence).  It should uphold the plea agreement 
while vacating the permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
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II. The permanent criminal stalking injunction is a sentence 
that is illegal under the circumstances. 
The State argues that because there is no explicit statutory prohibition on 
issuing a permanent criminal stalking injunction for non-stalking convictions, 
such injunctions should be an allowed sentence for apparently any conviction.  
See Br.Aple. 16-17.  The State further argues that this Court should consider a 
permanent criminal stalking injunction to be a civil penalty.  See Id.   
 As an initial matter, the State cites no authority to support its argument 
that a sentence cannot be illegal so long as there is no express statutory bar on it.  
Nor does the State cite any authority from any jurisdiction allowing a permanent 
criminal stalking injunction to issue absent a stalking conviction.  As a result, the 
State’s argument is inadequately briefed the Court should not consider it.  See, 
e.g., Broderick v. Apt. Mgmt. Consultants, L.L.C., 2012 UT 17, ¶ 10, 279 P.3d 391 
(“[W]e expect that both appellants and appellees will adhere to the standard of 
legal analysis set forth in rule 24(a).”). 
In any event, the State’s argument lacks merit.  The Utah Criminal Code 
has specifically abolished common law crimes: “[N]o conduct is a crime unless 
made so by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance.” Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-105.  One of the core purposes of Utah’s Criminal Code is to “[p]rescribe 
penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses and which 
permit the recognition or differences in rehabilitation possibilities among 
individual offenders.”  Id. § 76-1-104(3).  The Code also seeks to “[p]revent 
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arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses.”  
Id. § 76-1-104(4).  Likewise, illegal sentences are those “‘where the sentence does 
not conform to the crime of which the defendant has been convicted.’”  State v. 
Headley, 2002 UT App 58U (quoting State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1043 n.2 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)).  The State cites no authority to suggest that a permanent 
criminal stalking injunction conforms to the crime of retaliation against a 
witness.  Or that this Court should stray from its long-standing precedence of 
requiring a sentence to be authorized by code and proportionate to the offense.  
Instead, the State—again—without citing authority that Rule 11(e) should be 
limited only to length of incarceration.3  None of these arguments rebuts Mr. 
                                               
3 Indeed, ruling that parties can agree to any sentence that is not explicitly 
barred, even if not authorized by statute, would overrule a long line of cases 
holding otherwise.  See, e.g., Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 23 (holding permanent 
criminal stalking injunction could be imposed under Rule 11); Patience, 944 P.2d 
at 384 (sentencing a defendant according to felony statute was illegal when 
defendant should have been sentenced to a misdemeanor); State v. Sinju, 1999 
UT App 150U, ¶ 6 (defendant entitled to resentencing where plea agreement did 
not support sentencing enhancement). The absence of an explicit bar does not 
mean a sentence can be agreed to.  For example, although the indeterminate 
sentencing statutes use the word “may” rather than shall and do not exclude 
other sentences, it is generally accepted that the stated terms for each degree are 
the ranges allowed by statute, unless the statute otherwise provides. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203, -204. Likewise, although the capital felony penalties 
provision does not specifically state that the death penalty “only” applies to 
capital cases, a prosecutor would be hard-pressed to argue in favor of the death 
penalty for a non-capital case.  Although this is an extreme example, the State’s 
advocacy of allowing parties, including unrepresented defendants, to stipulate to 
punishments that don’t fit the crime would create a dangerous grey area for 
defendants who may be pressured into sentences that don’t fit their crimes. 
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Walton’s contention that a permanent criminal stalking injunction is an illegal 
sentence where there has been no stalking conviction. 
Instead, the State suggests that this Court should consider a permanent 
criminal stalking injunction—which is referenced in only the criminal stalking 
statute—should be an allowable civil penalty.  See Br.Aple. 17 n.8.  The State also 
cites no authority to support its assertion that a permanent criminal stalking 
injunction is merely a civil penalty and that it therefore not an illegal sentence.  
See Br.Aple. 17 n. 8.  This Court should therefore decline to consider it. See, e.g., 
Broderick, 2012 UT 17, ¶ 10 
In any event, this argument is not persuasive.  Although it is true that a 
sentencing court may impose a civil penalty and include a civil penalty in a 
sentence, the State cites no authority to suggest that a permanent criminal 
stalking injunction is a civil penalty.  The sentencing statute includes the phrase 
“any other civil penalty” after listing things such as dissolving a corporation, 
suspending or cancelling a license, or imposing a fine.  See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-201(3).  Such penalties are civil because they are generally imposed in civil 
court.  The State cites no case in which a permanent criminal stalking injunction 
was imposed in a civil case.  Moreover, the term “civil penalty” is generally 
considered a fine.  See, e.g., Blacks Law Dictionary Eighth Edition 2004 at 1168 
(defining “civil penalty” as “A fine assessed for a violation of a statute or 
regulation”); Law.com, dictionary.law.com (defining “civil penalty” as “fines or 
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surcharges imposed by a governmental agency to enforce regulations such as late 
payment of taxes, failure to obtain permit, etc.”); Id. § 78B-6-1603 (imposing 
“civil penalty” of a fine for hosting underage drinking gathering); id. § 19-6-416.5 
(imposing “civil penalty of $500 per [unpermitted] underground storage tank”); 
id. § 58-1-503 (allowing “civil penalty” of up to $2,000 per day for violating 
written order under DOPL statutes); id. § 10-3-703(2)(a) (with limited exception, 
allowing cities to impose “a civil penalty … by a fine not to exceed the maximum 
class B misdemeanor fine”).4  The State cites no authority to suggest that a 
permanent criminal injunction that is a mandatory part of a stalking sentence, 
never expires, and cannot be dissolved except on request by the victim should be 
considered a civil penalty.  See id. § 76-5-106.5(12).  Nor could it where civil 
penalties are generally either fines or otherwise time-limited.  As a result, the 
State’s argument lacks merit.  
III. The State ignores Mr. Walton’s jurisdictional argument 
with regard to his stalking conviction. 
 
The State argues that because this Court generally lacks jurisdiction to 
consider a collateral attack on a guilty plea via a direct appeal, that it should 
decline to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Walton’s challenge to his sentence in 
                                               
4 The State’s argument ignores that there are two avenues to obtain a stalking 
injunction—civil and criminal.  Unlike a criminal stalking injunction, a civil 
injunction does not require a stalking conviction, expires after three years, and 
can be dissolved or modified by the respondent on a showing of good cause as 




Case No. 161907013.5  Br.Aple. at 18-19.  However, if the stalking injunction is 
vacated, Mr. Walton’s conviction for violating the injunction would be void ab 
initio.  See, e.g., Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018) (citations 
omitted) (direct appeal not barred where challenge to guilty plea that calls “into 
question the Government’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’” a defendant).  
Thus, as with any jurisdictional challenge this Court may consider Mr. Walton’s 
challenge to his plea in Case No. 161907013.  See, e.g., Van Der Stappen v. Van 
Der Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)  (“[A] judgment can be 
attacked for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.”). 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated herein and as stated in the Brief of Appellant, Mr. 
Walton respectfully requests that in Case No. 121903179, the Court vacate the 
criminal stalking injunction as an illegal sentence.  In Case No. 16190713, Mr. 
Walton respectfully requests that his conviction and sentence be vacated as void 
ab initio. 
 DATED this 29th day of April 2019. 
 
 /s/ Deborah L. Bulkeley 
 Counsel for Appellant  
                                               
5 Mr. Walton concedes that his notice of appeal in Case No. 161907013 was 
untimely and notices the court that the contrary statement in his opening brief 
was due to an inadvertent error by counsel in reviewing the record.  However, 
this does not change the analysis of whether this Court should exercise 
jurisdiction to vacate the stalking conviction as void ab initio. 
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